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ABSTRACT
Heideggerian Authenticity in La Celestina and Don Quijote de la Mancha
Stevenson George Smith
Department of Spanish and Portuguese, BYU
Master of Arts
This study explores the intersection of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Spanish
literature. The study examines the Heideggerian authenticity and inauthenticity of two
characters in the literature: Melibea in La Celestina by Fernando de Rojas and Grisóstomo in
Don Quijote de la Mancha by Miguel de Cervantes. Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is the
ability of the individual to live in the world according to her own desires, outside of the influence
of others. Both die by suicide, but Melibea is an authentic character in Heideggerian terms and
Grisóstomo is inauthentic. At the end of her life, Melibea has resolved all anxiety into
resoluteness and is determined to live life in her own terms. Grisóstomo, however, dies
inauthentically, full of anxiety and subject to the will of Others. He never leaves the influence of
others to live a life of his own determination.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, authenticity, inauthenticity, phenomenology, La Celestina,
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Heideggerian Authenticity in La Celestina and Don Quijote de la Mancha
Introduction
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy is based on a phenomenological approach. He purports
to describe the concept of Being with the focus on the individual experience of Being. His
concept of existential authenticity is the ability of the individual to live in the world according to
her own desires, outside of the influence of others. We see the influence of Heideggerian
authenticity in Spanish literature from medieval times until now. Heidegger explains the
philosophy, but it is through the literature that it is understood.
This study will examine two protagonists from Spanish literature using the lens of
Heideggerian authenticity. The two examples are Melibea in La Celestina, by Fernando de
Rojas, and Grisóstomo in the episode of Marcela and Grisóstomo in Don Quijote de la Mancha,
by Miguel de Cervantes. Both die by suicide, but we will see that Melibea is an authentic
character in Heideggerian terms and that Grisóstomo is inauthentic. No study is needed to show
the inauthenticity of Grisóstomo—it is obvious using feminist criticism alone. However, the
authenticity of Melibea is not as obvious. Critics have written of Melibea in terms of
authenticity and of inauthenticity. Does she act under her own will, or is she subject to the wills
of others? Some say that she is subject to a spell and acts according to the wills of other people.
Other critics claim that she is merely playing the role of courtly love which prescribe her actions
in accordance with long-established rhetoric. Still others write that Melibea acts according to her
own self-determination. This study argues that Melibea lives an authentic life subject only to her
own will and desires and is an authentic character according to the philosophy of Heidegger.
Putting the question of Melibea’s authenticity in Heideggerian terms and contrasting her with the
inauthenticity of Grisóstomo provides a clear focus on her authentic character.
1

In Being and Time, Heidegger explains his existential philosophy. He describes the
human being, whom he names Dasein, in phenomenological terms. The essence of existence is
explained in relation to the experience of an individual human being who finds herself as a
“Being-in-the-world.” In the world, she encounters other beings like her, which Heidegger calls
“the they,” “das man” or “the Other.” The natural experience of the human being is to live under
the influence of Others. Heidegger says that such a life is not authentic. He views the collective
voice of Others as falseness and as the source of anxiety in the individual being. To have an
authentic life requires a modification of the natural life. To do so, one must reject the voice and
control of Others.
We see the authenticity of Melibea clearly, her resoluteness and her complete lack of
anxiety, upon comparing her with the inauthentic character of Grisóstomo. Grisóstomo’s final
poem shows a man filled with anxiety and inauthenticity—whereas Melibea’s final speech shows
a woman full of resoluteness. Anxiety and self-determination are markers that Heidegger uses to
denote inauthenticity and authenticity. A comparison of Melibea with Grisóstomo through the
lens of Heideggerian authenticity shows the self-determination of Melibea and the lack of selfdetermination of Grisóstomo. Furthermore, Melibea’s death is the death of one who sees her
potentiality for Being and is an authentic death. Grisóstomo’s death, on the other hand, is
inauthentic—he never sees his own potentiality.
From the very beginnings of philosophy, philosophers have dealt with the question of
Being. All philosophers prior to Heidegger viewed the concept of Being from the purely
scientific perspective of describing the Being of things in terms of their existence. For example,
the philosopher would describe the Being of an object in terms of its size or other physical
features. Their ontologies were oriented towards nature (Heidegger, Being 47). The ontology of
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Parmenides was that things show themselves for what they are and that the resulting truth about
the entity is its Being. He associated Being with a “...perspective understanding of Being” and
truth (256). Plato and Aristotle continued this ontology by looking at Being as an investigation
of the nature of objects (21, 30). But they did not differentiate the human being from other types
of entities. Their views of Being were based on an approach whereby objects were first
described using an understanding of the principles of natural science. St. Augustine realized that
such an approach was unsatisfactory, leaving him to proclaim, “But what is closer to me than
myself?” Yet his efforts to describe Being in other terms left him frustrated. He concluded, “I
have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat” (69, 489). In modern times,
Descartes described Being using the same ontology. His cogito ergo sum concept of Being
involved two different structures. First, there is that which thinks or the “I” that thinks. Second,
there is that which exists. But Descartes did not examine the thinking being further in terms of
its Being (44). Heidegger claims that Descartes got the cogito part right but failed to even
attempt to explain the sum part (71).
Heidegger set out to “…destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology” (44), and he
describes the concept of Being using a different approach. Rather than describing Being in
scientific terms, he describes it in terms of the phenomenon of the individual who experiences
what it is like to be. To Heidegger, the essence of existence is explained in relation to the life
experience of the individual who finds herself as a “Being-in-the-world.” Being in the world is
the totality of what one finds in life. He based his analysis on the concept of phenomenology, as
developed by Edmund Husserl, and the concept of the lifeworld, as developed by Wilhelm
Dilthey. His main concern was not to discuss the Being of all things; rather he focused on the
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Being of the human individual which is the being that is concerned about her own Being (236).
As such, the individual views her Being only in phenomenological terms.
Dilthey looked at life from a historical, social and humanistic viewpoint in which human
life cannot be separated from the world. Husserl expanded on Dilthey’s work and wrote of a
new philosophy of phenomenology, which seeks a method of investigation of a subjective
conscious state. Husserl taught that all philosophical questions must be looked at from a
phenomenological point of view. Heidegger defines phenomenology as looking at something
directly and discussing it as is (59). With such a view, one describes an object in terms of “how”
it is rather than what it is (50). For example, one may understand color through a scientific
explanation of light rays; but a phenomenological understanding of color is obtained by
discussing what it feels like to the individual who sees color. Heidegger writes that “Only as
phenomenology, is ontology possible” (60). By looking at the question of Being from a
phenomenological approach, the essence of Being can be discovered for what it is (60).
Heidegger’s method is to look at each fundamental aspect of the human individual and break it
down to the existential item from which individual cannot be separated. Only in phenomenology
can the Being of the individual be seen and understood ontologically. He maintains that one
must view Being through the lens of the life experience to gain any meaning at all.
For an analysis of Being to be meaningful, one must distinguish between different entities
to determine to what entity the significance of Being is the most important. To Heidegger, an
“entity” is “something which is” (22). But the Being of inanimate objects is not the Being of a
human being. We must be able to distinguish between entities in the discussion of Being.
Heidegger focused his enquiry to the Being of the human individual, whom he names Dasein,
and not about that of other entities. Philosophy before Heidegger did not distinguish between
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entities in its ontology. To Plato and Aristotle, the Being of a human is no different than the
Being of a stone. Because of that, Heidegger wrote, the basic state of Dasein is still “coveredup” (248). Heidegger describes the concept of Being using a different approach. He puts the
question of Being in the context of how Dasein phenomenologically experiences it and indicates
that an ontological analysis of a Being cannot be accomplished by considering the individual
human being as just another entity; rather, the individual is a being that understands its Being
(244).
Heidegger’s investigation into the Being of Dasein is centered on the existential
structures of Dasein. The existentials refer to those fundamental aspects of Dasein that are a
priori to Dasein and which cannot be separated from her. No discussion of the Being of Dasein
can be had without consideration of the existentials. Heidegger discusses the existentials that
together form the basis for the ontological understanding of the individual human being. He
writes that the greatest of all the existentials is Being-in-the-world (78). The world is not to be
thought of as the planet Earth or the physical world in which we live; rather, the world is only
understood in the context of an existential of Being. Scientifically, Being-in-the-world means
that the individual exists physically. But, the world is an ontological structure rather than
something that we see and touch. Heidegger describes the concept of the world to be “...the
totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world” (93). The world is the
place wherein the individual lives.
Dilthey was the first to describe living in the world as one of the fundamental categories
of human life. He wrote of the experience of the reality of the world and expressed reality in
terms of resistance (252). Resistance of the world is how Dasein experiences the world. The
world of Heidegger is expressed in the “average everydayness” of the world of the individual
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(37-38). The individual always understands her existence in a certain way and that way is
Being-in-the-world (245). Her reality is that she cannot be separated from the world, she and the
world are together from the beginning. The sense that the individual has of Being-in-the-world
is a priori to any other understanding. Her consciousness which is inside herself and the reality
of the external world both constitute her essence.
Authenticity and inauthenticity to Heidegger relate to how the individual reacts to other
people she associates with in the world. As a Being-in-the-world, the individual finds that she is
not alone and that she lives with other beings like herself, whom Heidegger calls “Others,” “das
man,” or “the ‘they’” (149-50). These Others are different from other entities in the world
because they are of the same nature as the individual. As an individual interacts with Others,
differences appear in the interaction, and a distance—what Heidegger calls a “distantiality”—
develops between them. The individual notices the distance and attempts to shorten it by moving
herself towards the Others, causing the individual to lose part of herself and become subject to
them. Her manner of living in the world is subjugated to them and she acts as they do. She does
not have her own individual experience of the world.
The individual views her relationship with Others either as being behind them and trying
to “catch up,” or as being ahead of them and trying to keep them suppressed. Heidegger writes:
But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday
Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; it’s Being has
been taken away by the Others. Dasein’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the
Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On
the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous
domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as
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Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. ‘The Others’
whom one thus designates to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to them essentially
oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part ‘are there’ in everyday Beingwith-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people,
and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the “they” [das Man]. (164)
The Others become a dictatorship. The individual is judged not by what the world gives
to her but by what she gives to the world. The individual has lost her ownness and is entangled
in a world of useless understanding. Heidegger explains, “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves
as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge;
likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they
find shocking” (164). This is the kind of Being that the individual becomes in her everydayness.
The “they” are the basic state of her Being-in-the-world. The “they” maintains itself based on
the averageness of everyday life which averageness Heidegger calls an existential characteristic
of the “they.” This averageness “levels down” every possibility of Being (165). By becoming
part of the “they,” the individual “disburdens” herself of all agency and responsibility.
Heidegger states that thereby the “who” of Dasein becomes “nobody” (166). But the fact that the
everyday average life is attributable to nobody does not mean that the “they” is nothing.
Heidegger maintains that this is the reality of the Being of Dasein (166).
The human individual leads an inauthentic life by being part of the “they.” The group
holds power over the individual. While succumbing to that power, the individual loses her
ownness. This is what Heidegger means by inauthenticity. The inauthentic life is the natural
state in which the individual finds herself. Heidegger describes the everyday inauthentic life of
the “they” as the falling of the individual because she is lost in the “they” (219-20). She likewise
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is thrown into the world and must work to gain an authentic life by taking charge of her own life
while she awaits her death. Dasein can find freedom by fleeing from her fallen state. She does
so by facing herself and turning away from Others. An authentic life requires the individual to
modify the natural state and take charge of her own self (166-168). To live authentically, she
must reject the influence of Others and take charge of her own life while she seeks her own
potentiality. Releasing oneself from the power of Others towards one’s self-determination is
Heideggerian authenticity.
Heidegger argues that the individual lives in a state of anxiety, which is part of Being-inthe-world. He distinguishes anxiety from fear. Fear is the state of mind of concern for some
harmful entity within the world that may come from a definite possibility. On the other hand,
anxiety does not arise from any entity in the world. Anxiety arises from the individual seeing
that authenticity is a possibility. He states that “Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost
Being-in-the world, which… projects itself essentially upon possibilities” (232). The projection
of possibilities comes only through anxiety. Anxiety makes it conceivable for the individual to
be free to choose her own Being. The individualization that results from that freedom separates
her from Others and, in Heidegger’s words, it brings “Dasein face to face with its world as
world” and to “itself as a Being-in-the-world” (233).
Heidegger states that anxiety is a state of “uncanniness,” by which he means “not-beingat-home” (233). The human being is not at home in the “they,” or she is not authentic.
Heidegger further states:
This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the
“they”, though not explicitly. This threat can go together factically with complete
assurance and self-sufficiency in one’s everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most
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innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it is commonly
easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatically “nothing” to see, though
the very world itself is still ‘there’, and ‘there’ more obtrusively. (234)
The uncanniness that Dasein feels in its anxiety is the source of Dasein’s possibility for
authenticity. Heidegger explains, “But in anxiety there lies the possibility of disclosure which is
quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its
falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being”
(235).
While anxiety makes it possible for the individual to be aware of her falling into the
“they,” it is resoluteness that helps her choose her own authenticity and her own kind of
Being. If the individual is to throw off the inauthentic life, she must allow anxiety to lead to
resoluteness and bring herself to make a choice. In her basic state of Being-in-the-world, no
choice is needed because Others have made all the decisions. Anxiety may or may not lead to
resoluteness; but if it does do so, the individual finds truth in her own authenticity and thus
becomes free. Heidegger writes:
When Dasein thus brings itself back from the “they”, the they-self is modified in an
existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self. This must be
accomplished by making up for not choosing. But “making up” for not choosing
signifies choosing to make this choice—deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making
this decision from one’s own Self” (313).
Howard N. Tuttle explains it this way:
Dasein must be resolved to the fact that it is at once its own possibilities and a falling
short of them. This condition creates in Dasein an anxiety over its own imperfections and
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finitude—and this very anxiety provides a … means … for authenticity and retrieval of
the self from the nullification by the crowd…. In anxiety and guilt, through resoluteness
and conscience, Dasein appropriates its freedom to become its authentic own-ness; its
bondage to the crowd is released through its disclosure of its finite possibilities. In the
call of conscience, guilt, and anxiety it resolutely creates a life that belongs to itself and
not to the “they.” Released from the distractions of the “they,” it becomes a freedom
toward its own death. (76)
It is through anxiety, conscience and resoluteness that Dasein finds truth in her own authenticity
and thus becomes free.
The individual is a being in time and her life is connected to time. One cannot
understand Being by ignoring time. As the human being lives through time, she interprets the
world to gain an understanding of meaning and truth. Because she is thrown into her
circumstances, the past and the present of her understanding of the world has been interpreted
already for her by Others. Her possibilities have been “dimmed down” and her concern has
become “blind to its possibilities.” However, the future still belongs to her. Heidegger argues
that the tranquilization of Dasein by the opinions of the “they” does not mean that Dasein’s
possibilities are gone, merely modified (239). The understanding of the individual is always
ahead of herself. Heidegger referred to this as “...understanding as self-projective Being towards
its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (236). The past and the present are set by the “they” while
the future is in the control of the individual.
There are three dimensions of time: the past, the present, and the future. The past is an
existential part of the Being of the human individual. She deals with her past to understand it.
The totality of her past is what brings her to the present. The present is fleeting and constantly
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turning into the past, and the future is constantly turning into the present. But she is always
considering the future with anticipation. The future is the horizon. She uses the present to
correct her past as she considers the future and its possibilities.
The individual is in the process of dying from the moment of her birth, and if she is alive,
she has potential for being something she is not (276). When Heidegger speaks of death, he does
not refer to anything beyond the world or to any life after this life. He speaks of death at the end
of the experience of this life as part of Being-in-the-world. Additionally, he does not speak of
death as a goal or of anyone who is looking towards an end. Rather, Heidegger’s Dasein is a
“Being-towards-death” when she seeks her potentiality before she dies (277). Such a Being is
looking to her end as she looks to her potential, a possibility for each person and a representation
of the individual’s authentic state. Heidegger writes that once confronted with her death, the
individual flees from it (297-98). “Fleeing in the face of death” means to be a fugitive from that
fact; it is always someone else who dies, but never “me.” The individual publicly denies her
own death, knowing that it will come. Each case of death is that of someone else—it is never her
death. That which dies is “nobody” (297). Her own death will come, but not yet. A Beingrelative-to-death is a fugitive relative to its death. Heidegger writes:
To maintain oneself in this truth— that is, to be certain of what has been disclosed—
demands all the more that one should anticipate. We cannot compute the certainty of
death by ascertaining how many cases of death we encounter. This certainty is by no
means of the kind which maintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When
something present-at-hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most purely if we just
look at the entity and let it be encountered in itself. Dasein must first have lost itself in
the factual circumstances (this can be one of care’s own tasks and possibilities) if it is to
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obtain the pure objectivity—that is to say, the indifference—of apodictic evidence. If
Being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, this does not mean that it
is of a lower grade, but that it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of
evidence we can have about the present-at-hand. (309)
The result is the same in each case. Each falling leads to an existence that is “towards-death.”
It is in the lifeworld and phenomenology of Dilthey and Husserl where the philosophy of
Heidegger intersects with literature. Heidegger writes of Being in terms of the reality of the life
experience of real human beings, whereas literature sometimes departs from reality. However,
the two meet in the lifeworld where literature rarely departs from the phenomenon of the Beingin-the-world. Even when literature departs from the reality of natural law, it does not depart
from the existential phenomenon the human being experiences in its Being. Heidegger explains
Being in a piece of art, writing, “The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This
opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e. the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work,
the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work” (“Origin” 38).
While a piece of literature may depart from the reality of physics, it does not depart from
the reality of Being. We see examples of this in fantastic literature as well as in science fiction.
For example, in El Burlador de Sevilla, Tirso de Molina describes the death of Don Juan Tenorio
in fantastic terms—he dines with the statue of Don Gonzalo who subsequently pulls him into his
tomb (196-99). This is totally contrary to how death happens in nature. The literature departs
from reality; however, the phenomenon of how an individual faces death does not. Don Juan
denies the reality of his death, or as Heidegger wrote, he flees “in the face of death” until the
very moment of that death. At that moment he proclaims, “¡Muerto soy!” (199). Before that
moment, Don Juan is an inauthentic character in that he sees no potentiality of change as he
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awaits death—he is not a Being-towards-death. Throughout the work whenever anyone
discusses death, Don Juan declares “¡Qué largo me lo fiáis!” (119). He knows that he will die,
but not for a long time—it is not a reality to him at that time. Clearly Don Juan denies his death.
He is a character placed in fantastic literature who flees from his death the way Heidegger argues
that the inauthentic human being does.
A second example of the departure from reality in literature while maintaining truth in the
lifeworld is found in Cien años de soledad by Gabriel García Márquez. At the death of José
Arcadio Buendía, “Un hilo de sangre salió por debajo de la puerta” (163). His blood ran through
the street until it came to the door of his mother, Ursula, where it took a right turn and entered
her house. This is how Ursula became aware of the death of her son. This is literature of
magical realism, and it describes a scene that does not occur in reality. However, the symbolism
of blood running through the street as testimony of death is truth to the experience of the human
being in the lifeworld. We may see news of someone dying in war or in a school shooting;
however, it is the fact of their blood that brings the truth of their deaths to us.
A final example comes from science fiction in the novel Lágrimas en la lluvia by Rosa
Montero where Bruna Husky is an android. Her life is almost like that of a human being, but not
quite. One major difference is that she knows the exact moment of her death and counts down
the years, months, and days periodically throughout the text. She knows the date of her death
because the androids in the novel are all programed to die at a certain point of their existence. In
reality, human beings do not know the exact moment of their deaths. However, in the science
fiction world of the novel, Bruna Husky is an authentic Being-towards-death. The first line of
the text reads, “Bruna despertó sobresaltada y recordó que iba a morir” (11). She sees the
potential for change and pursues her life to make changes that she sees as important.
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These are just a few examples from Hispanic literature where fictitious characters living
in a fictitious world act in ways congruent with the lifeworld of the human experience.
Certainly, the same can be said for La Celestina and Don Quijote de la Mancha, which are
examples of Golden Age literature in which the literary art departs from the reality of the
physical world yet bears truth of the human experience. The remainder of this study will
examine these two latter works.
The chapters that follow examine the authenticity of Melibea in La Celestina and the
inauthenticity of Grisóstomo in the episode of Grisóstomo and Marcela in Don Quijote de la
Mancha using the language of Heideggerian authenticity as outlined above. Chapter 1 examines
the role of Melibea and demonstrate that her death, by her own hand, is an act of Heideggerian
authenticity. At the end, Melibea has the complete absence of any anxiety and she acts out of
resoluteness. Chapter 2 considers the role of Grisóstomo and argues that his death, also by his
own hand, is an example of Heideggerian inauthenticity. Grisóstomo ends his life with an
overwhelming amount of anxiety and a complete lack of resoluteness, as explained by Heidegger.
The chapter then contrasts Melibea’s words and actions with those of Grisóstomo to demonstrate
that Melibea’s acts and death are authentic, that she acts according to her own will and desires,
and not subject to the wills of any other person or influence. On the other hand, Grisóstomo’s acts
and death are inauthentic; his actions are influenced and controlled by Others.
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Chapter 1. The Authenticity of Melibea in La Celestina
Melibea from La Celestina is an example of an individual who exhibits authenticity from
a Heideggerian viewpoint. At the beginning of the work, Melibea gives ambiguous signals, both
to Calisto and to the reader. At the end of the work, she dies of her own hand. However, prior to
doing so, she has resolved all anxiety into resoluteness. She is the Heideggerian example of a
Being-towards-death.
There are, however, many interpretations of an inauthenticity relating to Melibea’s
actions. Not only do other characters in the work wish to control her, but even we, five hundred
years later, want to have a say in how she acts. Some critics interpret Melibea as an inauthentic
individual. Examples of interpretations of inauthenticity include those that claim that the work is
a commentary on the cultural society of the times (Round), that it is literature of courtly love
(Green), or that it is literature of spells and magic (Deyermond). Other critics say that Melibea is
authentic in that she determines her own destiny and not that chosen by others (Calvo). This
study argues that Melibea exemplifies Heideggerian authenticity and that she leaves the
influence of those around her, determining her own destiny. She does show signs of
inauthenticity at the beginning of the work; however, the fact that one begins in a state of
inauthenticity does not preclude one from ending authentically. Indeed, Being-in-the-world
makes it impossible to not begin with an inauthentic life. Heidegger explains that all individuals
begin in inauthentic states and that it is the process of anxiety leading to resoluteness that allows
the individual to see the future as a potential for authenticity. This is certainly true in Melibea’s
case.
The first act of the tragicomedy in Melibea’s garden is an allegory for the rest of the
work. The garden is surrounded by a wall and Melibea is enclosed in this space. She does not
have her own space in life; she is enclosed in the space prescribed by her father. As such, she
15

lives innocently. The garden is a locus amoenus and a metaphor of Melibea’s innocence.
Calisto enters the garden in pursuit of his falcon and finds Melibea there inside. He enters
without an invitation and invades the space provided for her by her father. Calisto immediately
falls in love with Melibea, elevating her to a goddess. He speaks of her perfect beauty as a gift to
him. Ostensibly, this is the first time Calisto has seen Melibea and he only sees her for a few
moments. Yet later, as he describes her to his servant Sempronio, he gives complete details of
all aspects of her face and body. Calisto idealizes Melibea and falls in love with her illogically.
Melibea rejects Calisto’s advances but gives him ambiguous signals. Her first rejection is
with these words: “Pues aun más ygual galardón te daré yo si perseveras” (212). Calisto is
indeed there seeking a prize. Peter Russell explains that Melibea uses the term “prize” as a threat
and that Calisto intentionally misunderstands her (Russell, note 18, 212). There is no doubt that
Russell is correct in his interpretation. However, one must not miss the ambiguity and irony of
Melibea’s reference to the greater prize. In the end, she does give Calisto the greater prize that
he pretends to expect. Dorothy Severin makes a slightly different interpretation of Melibea’s
rejection. For Severin, Melibea is playing a role pertaining to courtly love and refers to the gift
the lady gives her pursuer. Severin writes, “Aquí Melibea parece hacer un uso sarcástico de uno
de los elementos primordiales del amor cortés, el del galardón o prenda de amor que premia la
devoción del amante” (Severin, note 6, 87). These different interpretations of Melibea’s words
demonstrate that she speaks ambiguously; not only does Calisto interpret them as he wishes, but
readers and critics do so also.
In a second rejection, Melibea further rebuffs Calisto’s advances saying, “Calisto, ha
seýdo de ingenio de tal hombre como tú haver de salir para se perder en la virtud de tal muger
como yo. ¡Vete, vete de aý, torpe: que no puede mi paciencia tollerar que aya subido en coraçón
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humano comigo el ylícito amor comunicar su deleyte!” (213). Russell gives his interpretation of
Melibea’s words as, “tu propósito, Calisto, ha sido tal como del ingenio de un hombre como tú se
tenía que esperar, pero tus palabras sólo salen para echarse a perder ante la virtud de tal mujer
como yo” (Russell, note 20, 213). A. Millares Carlo and José Ignacio Mantecón also comment
on this phrase saying, “La frase significa: ‘que a ningún corazón humano se le haya ocurrido que
un amor ilícito pueda comunicar conmigo su deleite” (Carlo, note 2, 39). While Melibea’s words
contain a clear rejection of Calisto’s advances, they are also ambiguous. Is she saying that no
one like him should dare speak with her, thereby spoiling her virtue; or is she telling him that he
only needs to have patience and engage a go-between to accomplish his desires? Note that
Melibea does not criticize Calisto’s desire for illicit love, only that he communicates it directly to
her.
The ambiguity of the opening act enables critics to interpret the text differently. While
some critics focus on the control the other protagonists in the work maintain on Melibea, others
focus on the liberating actions that she takes. This study will demonstrate that both viewpoints
are valid using Heideggerian language. While the work begins with Melibea as a subject totally
within the control of Others, it ends with her taking responsibility for her own being.
Nicholas Round comments that La Celestina has been interpreted as a moral teaching but
that “Alternatively we may take it as testament of raw human experience, whose corrosive doubt
and pessimism make nonsense of all traditional categories” (38). His interpretation takes the
work in the context of the medieval society in which the story takes place. Round maintains that
the text is a parody that is understood by two different perspectives. The moral understanding is
that all the protagonists are immoral and that is the cause of all the deaths at the end of the book.
Round maintains that there is opposition between moral norms and actual social conduct.
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However, he explains that the book has few references to moral values (39). His perspective is
that the work is about Celestina and that she is an integral part of her society and an equal with
all others in it. The text speaks of greed and fortune and explains that money is what makes
society function (50). Calisto has money and his role in the society is to circulate his wealth.
The new social order of the era requires it. Celestina’s role is important because she ensures that
the wealth is circulated. Without her, Calisto’s wealth would remain with him and the economy
would not advance. This interpretation of the text does not question morality or immorality.
Neither does it question authenticity or inauthenticity. It is a commentary on how the society
functions. The role of Melibea herself is of little importance in this interpretation.
In a different interpretation, Otis Green writes in “La furia de Melibea” that Melibea and
Calisto are actors in roles of courtly love, each playing the roles assigned. Such an interpretation
is one of inauthenticity in Melibea’s actions. In Heideggerian terms, she is controlled,
inauthentically, by the will of Others in a role prescribed by Others. Green attributes Melibea’s
strong rejections as her acting pursuant to the rules that govern this literature (1). Courtly love
was well understood by the readers of the time. From the opening scene, the reader does not
really know Melibea’s true feelings towards Calisto because both of her rejections are made in
accordance with these rules of courtly love. She is merely playing her role. She controls her
actions to be in accordance with rules set long beforehand by Others. She does not allow herself
to deviate from these rules, possibly hiding her desires. Calisto, however, breaks these rules by
conducting his love openly, without discretion (1). Speaking of the coming of his death, Green
argues that “Calisto…prepara su propia muerte—sin confesión—por hacer caso omiso, no sólo
de las reglas del amor caballeresco, sino también de los pecados mortales…” (1). Calisto’s death
is mixed up between the death he should have for damaging Melibea’s honor and the death he
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deserves for confessing to Melibea instead of to God. Melibea on the other hand complies with
her role of courtly love. Her death, therefore, must be by her own hand.
Alan Deyermond makes a different but equally compelling argument to show that each of
the protagonists, including Melibea, does not act in self-determined ways. Melibea and Calisto
are victims of the tragedy just as Celestina is. Deyermond writes of Celestina’s threads,
Melibea’s cord, and Calisto’s chain as metaphors, each having similar forms (6-7). Celestina
spins her threads to sell to Melibea. Melibea’s cord is the belt that she wears around her body to
secure her clothing. She gives the cord to Celestina in exchange for the threads. Later, Calisto
gives his chain to Celestina in exchange for the cord. These objects evoke the image of hunting
and remind us of Calisto with his falcon finding Melibea as his prize. Just as the principal theme
of La Celestina is Calisto’s hunting for Melibea, these objects bring potent images. It is through
these instruments that Calisto traps Melibea. He is the hunter, she the prize; and Celestina helps
Calisto set the trap. Melibea herself has no say in the matter. Deyermond writes that this is a
hunt of lust and greed and each is a victim. After touching these objects, each of the three
protagonists changes. At the beginning, Melibea is chaste. She rejects Calisto. She only falls in
love with him after touching the threads. Deyermond writes that Melibea symbolically gives
herself to Celestina as she gives her cord (8). Celestina has anointed the threads with snake oil
and has put a spell on them (Rojas 290). She asks the Devil to be in the threads until Melibea
purchases them. Deyermond writes, “The Devil has been told to remain in the skein until
Melibea has bought it, the implication being that he can then leave it; and this is what he seems
to do. He takes possession of Melibea’s will, inflaming her with desire for Calisto….” (7). It is
because of the spell that Melibea falls in love with Calisto. Deyermond’s interpretation is one of
involuntary action on Melibea’s part. She acts according to Celestina’s will. This is complete
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inauthenticity in Heideggerian terms. Melibea is captive to the will of Others; she is completely
influenced by them.
These are only a few examples of inauthenticity in Melibea’s actions. There are,
however, other interpretations of the work that involve authentic actions—interpretations that
show that Melibea acts according to her own self-determination. One interpretation of
authenticity in Melibea’s and Calisto’s action is the idea that the work centers on the cultural
conflict between Catholic tradition and Jewish conversos. Some critics claim that Celestina’s
service as a go-between is necessary because Melibea’s father Pleberio is a converso precluding
her from marrying Calisto who comes from an old Catholic line. Segundo Serrano Poncela
writes of hidden keys in the text itself. He cites passages which note Calisto’s “clara sangre”
and his “claro linajee.” Serrano Poncela maintains that La Celestina “…es la historia de los
difíciles amores entre un cristiano viejo de ‘noble linaje, claro ingenio, gentil disposición y linda
crianza’ llamado Calisto y una judía perversa de nombre Melibea” (493). He contends that both
participated in the affair “…voluntariamente en una clara situación de desafío antisocial que, a
trompicones con toda clase de dificultades, termina con la muerte” (491). Serrano Poncela
speaks of a secret in the work—that Melibea’s father is a converso. He maintains that Melibea
and Calisto already know each other before the encounter in the garden. Each desires to love the
other voluntarily and they keep their love secret (501). Celestina’s role is to facilitate the open
expression of their love.
Alvaro Custodio, writing in response to Serrano Poncela’s arguments, points out that the
use of go-betweens was common and natural in these times and was used to merely enable the
two lovers to communicate. Custodio sees no need to invent any racial or other impediments in
the work (210). He writes, “No creo que haga falta buscar otra explicación a la clandestinidad
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de los amores de Calixto y Melibea que la rotunda negativa de la doncella, muy dentro del pudor
femenino ante tan brusca e inusitada declaración—tras de saltar las tapias de su huerto—en la
primera escena de la obra” (209). Custodio argues that Melibea knows from the first encounter
in the garden that Calisto wants an illicit relationship with her. She is not fooled nor is she play
acting. She knows from the very beginning what the relationship will be. When she submits to
him she does so knowing all the facts. For Custodio, Melibea and Calisto are two lovers who sin
and continue doing so until Calisto falls and dies. She is not controlled by others in her actions
either by the rules of the courtly love of a previous era or the magic and snake oil of
Celestina. Melibea makes her own decisions and lives through the actions of those decisions. In
this interpretation, the authenticity of Melibea is undeniable. She moves within the work
authentically, in pursuit of her own desires despite the cultural bans of Others. This is Melibea’s
manner of Being-in-the-world. It is not about her parents, or her morality, or Celestina’s magic.
Melibea is an authentic Being. If her death is the result of her dissent of society, then it is an
authentic death.
Calisto’s death came as a complete surprise to him. He never contemplated his own
death. His was an inauthentic death much like Grisóstomo’s in Don Quijote de la
Mancha. Calisto falls from the ladder his servants had placed on the garden wall at the time of
his last visit with Melibea. On falling, he calls for confession and divine help saying, “¡O,
válame santa María! ¡Muerto soy! ¡Confessión!” (574). He asks for confession at the exact
moment of his death. He had not thought of his own death until its occurrence. A significant
aspect of Calisto’s death is that it occurred in the same place as the drama began—the wall of
Melibea’s garden. At the beginning of the tragicomedy, Calisto does not pay attention to God or
to his death. When Sempronio asks if he (Calisto) is Christian, Calisto’s response is “Yo
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melibeo soy y a Melibea adoro y en Melibea creo y a Melibea amo” (220). His only focus is
Melibea. Only now, at the moment of his demise, does he consider death. Prior to that moment
he had no thoughts as to the possibility of his own potentiality-for-Being.
This is not the case with Melibea. Of all the deaths in the work, it is that of Melibea that
is authentic. Even as she takes her own life, Melibea is the only character in the work who looks
at the future of her life in terms of its potentiality. The fact that her death is by suicide is of no
importance in this context. Nevertheless, Melibea does not always manifest this authenticity
throughout the entire work; rather, she transforms as the work progresses.
Melibea begins in the work as a two-dimensional character, a beautiful woman, an object
to be admired, valued for her physical beauty. Descriptions of her in the work emphasize her
body. In Calisto’s mind, she is an object of beauty; but to others, she is repulsive. In act IX,
Areúsa describes Melibea using language and images completely opposite to those Calisto had
previously used as he described her to Sempronio. Whereas Calisto had said that Melibea’s head
was as fine gold and that its beauty is enough to convert men into stones (230-31), Areúsa now
says that her beauty comes from her wealth and not from the beauty of her body (408). Calisto
had described her breasts as small and now Areúsa describes them saying that they appear as if
she had borne three children and that they look like two large pumpkins. Each describes Melibea
without really knowing who she is. Françoise Maurizi points out that Calisto has described
Melibea in terms of the Medieval archetype of the woman (59). If Calisto’s description is an
idealization, then Areúsa’s description is the opposite of the ideal. Maurizi also notes that
neither Calisto nor Areúsa have seen the covered parts of Melibea’s body. These ideas of
Melibea are different imaginations of her, neither description is accurate. Both Calisto and
Areúsa wish to cast Melibea according to their own desires. Celestina wishes to do so also.
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Maurizi writes that Melibea transforms herself and that she can be the damsel in the garden that
Calisto desires as well as the old ugly woman of Areúsa’s liking (60). He writes of the
dethroning of Melibea saying, “La doncella ‘graciosa y gentil’ destronizada por los denuestos
viene a ser una figura de carnaval, un espantapájaros, un pelele objeto de las burlas del pueblo
que lo puede dejar maltrecho verbal y físicamente” (66). In Heideggerian terms, Melibea is
stripped of everything she is to be made into the object of the liking of Others. She is valued, or
not valued, by their perceptions of her. The inverse is not true, as her perceptions of herself are
of no meaning. She has no right to be what she is to herself.
As the tragicomedy progresses, the reader begins to see beyond the body that Calisto
desires and understands other dimensions of Melibea as an individual—as a specific Dasein.
Melibea changes from an individual controlled by the wills of Others to one who authentically
determines her own life. Yadira Calvo gives an interpretation of Melibea as a self-determined
individual and notes the point of her transformation. She writes that Melibea is the representation
of a woman of her times subjugated by her society. Calvo contends that a chaste woman of the
times must also be an inexperienced and ignorant woman. Melibea is the prototype of this chaste
woman (83). For Calvo, all the protagonists who interact with Melibea represent the consensus
of other people. “Melibea,” writes Calvo, “es vista como un ser pasivo cuyo destino depende
enteramente de la voluntad de los demás” (85). Everyone asserts the common voice on her.
Calvo particularly mentions Alisa, Melibea’s mother, in this regard. Pleberio, her father, at least
wishes that Melibea has some say in whom she will marry. Alisa counters that Melibea knows
nothing about men or marriage therefore she cannot participate in such a decision (83).
Melibea transforms herself from an inexperienced woman to one of self-determination
midway through the work, in her first soliloquy. At this point, she realizes that she is not free
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and shows signs of anxiety. She worries about the judgment of Others, particularly her servant
Lucrecia, who has witnessed Melibea’s actions. Melibea expresses regret for her actions saying,
“¡O lastimada de mí! ¡O mal proveýda donzella!” (Rojas 426). Calvo believes that the anxiety
Melibea feels here is caused by society’s different treatment of women versus men in this regard.
She quotes Melibea speaking to Lucrecia saying, “¿Por qué no fue también a las hembras
concedido poder descobrir su congoxoso y ardiente amor, como a los varones? ¡Que ni Calisto
viviera quexoso, ni yo penada! (Rojas 427). Melibea’s anxiety, in Calvo’s view, comes from the
subjugation her society has over her. Heidegger would also agree. This is the critical moment
for Melibea, according to Calvo, as she begins making her own decisions at this point. She
writes, “Melibea ha llegado, pues a un momento crítico: es entonces cuando se subleva contra la
moral establecida y toma su primera decisión. A partir de este momento empezamos a sentir
respeto por ella: por el valor de enfrentar su propia voluntad a la voluntad del grupo” (86-87). It
is interesting that Calvo points out that Melibea’s self-determination begins with the expression
of her anxiety. Calvo views Melibea as a woman who matures through the course of the work.
Her suicide is an act of free will and the culmination of the metamorphosis of her personality.
Melibea does not die as an act of her sin, she dies in an act of her liberty (89).
Calvo’s analysis of Melibea comes from a feminist viewpoint; however, the anxiety
leading to Melibea’s self-determination can also be viewed in terms of Melibea worrying about
the judgement of Others, particularly her servant Lucrecia. In Heideggerian terms, this selfdetermination is authenticity and the rejection of the group is the rejection of the “they.”
Melibea’s anxiety works in her to eventually give her resoluteness. Lucrecia has witnessed
Melibea’s actions. Melibea expresses her worries of Lucrecia’s judgement saying, “¡O mi fiel
criada Lucrecia! ¿Qué dirás de mí, qué pensarás de mi seso, quando me veas publicar lo que a ti
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jamás he quesido descobrir? ¡Cómo te espantarás del rompimiento de mi honestidad y
vergüença que siempre como encerrada donzella acostumbré tener!” (Rojas 426). She is looking
at her actions through the lens of Lucrecia’s judgement, and she is uncertain about what she has
done. This uncertainty does not come from her own point of view; it is true anxiety expressed
from the viewpoint of Others. Heidegger writes that it is anxiety that leads the individual to the
moment of being able to question herself about her inauthenticity (Being 235). The questioning
allows the individual to see her potential for an authentic life. This happens to Melibea here in
this scene and is a clearing for Melibea. Her anxiety has led her to question herself as an object
of Others, and her anxiety diminishes. This is the beginning of her resoluteness.
By the time of her final scene at the end of the work as she speaks with her father,
Melibea has resolved her anxiety completely into resoluteness. Lucrecia, however, has not. She
wants to hide everything from Pleberio saying, “Llamaré a tu padre y fingiremos otro mal, pues
éste no es para se poder encobrir” (578). Melibea will have none of it. She has decided on her
actions and she will tell her father everything. Her death is not painful to her. From the top of
the tower, she looks down on her father and says, “Mi fin es llegado, llegado es mi descanso y tu
passión, llegado es mi alivio y tu pena, llegada es mi acompañada hora y tu tiempo de soledad”
(585). She clearly has no anxiety. She describes her imminent death to her father as an “alegre
partida” (586). Later she calls her death “mi agradable fin” (589). Pleberio is
distraught. Melibea, however, is resolute. She tells her father to control himself because she has
something to tell him. She continues:
Si me escuchas sin lágrimas, oyrás la causa desesperada de mi forçada y alegre
partida. No la interrumpas con lloro ni palabras, si no, quedarás más quexoso en no saber
por qué me mato, que doloroso por verme muerta. Ninguna cosa me preguntes ni
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respondas más de lo que de mi grado dezirte quisiere, porque, quando el coraçón está
embargado de passión, están cerrados los oýdos al consejo, y en tal tiempo las frutuosas
palabras, en lugar de amansar, acrecientan la saña. (586)
Melibea loves Calisto. Her transformation to authenticity began in her garden. She decided that
she wanted a life with him in Act I when she told him, “Pues aun más ygual galardón te daré yo
si perseveras” (212). Just after his death, she says, “¿Cómo no gozé más del gozo? ¿Cómo tuve
en tan poco la gloria que entre mis manos tove? ¡O ingratos mortales, jamás conoscés vuestros
bienes sino quando dellos carescéys!” (577). Melibea’s love for Calisto does not come from
Celestina’s spell. In explaining her story to her father, Melibea tells him that she herself had told
Celestina of her desire. This desire did not come from Celestina; it came from within Melibea.
She tells her father:
Muchos días son passados, padre mío, que penava por mi amor un cavallero que se
llamava Calisto, el qual tú bien conociste. Conosciste assí mismo sus padres y claro
linaje. Sus virtudes y bondad a todos eran manifiestas. Era tanta su pena de amor y tan
poco el lugar para hablarme que descubrió su pasión a una astuta y sagaz muger, que
llamavan Celestina. La qual, de su parte venida a mí, sacó mi secreto amor de mi pecho.
Descobr[í] a ella lo que a mi querida madre encubría. Tovo manera como ganó mi
querer; ordenó cómo su desseo [de Calisto] y el mío hoviessen efeto. (587-88)
This statement clarifies Celestina’s involvement. Because of the confinement of space, Melibea
needed Celestina to make the love affair possible by facilitating the communication with Calisto.
It was not Celestina’s serpent oil or Calisto’s chain that caused Melibea to love him; Melibea
herself fell in love with Calisto. She was the architect of her own life. She chose to change her
life from that of an innocent damsel to that of a woman in love; nobody forced her.
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Melibea left a life figuratively enclosed in the garden when she chose to love Calisto.
Once outside the garden metaphorically, she continues until she is outside physically. However,
her only chance of escaping the garden is with her death. While she was having the affair with
Calisto, Melibea was free, but she becomes an enclosed woman once again with his death. She
tells her father (and herself) that she takes her life so that she can be with Calisto. However, her
soliloquy as she ascends the steps of the tower reveals another motive—that she can only live a
self-determined life by dying. Heidegger refers to an authentic being as one who understands her
own potential as she approaches death. Death is the horizon, and the authentic individual looks
to it as she exercises her own will. In Melibea’s case, her father and her society have enclosed
her, and she has no ability to change that. The only possibility of freedom other than her own
death would be to take her father’s life instead. This is what she considers, and rejects, as she
walks up the steps to her death. She begins her soliloquy saying, “De todos soy dexada; bien se
ha adereçado la manera de morir.” How can she be abandoned by everyone? Doesn’t she still
have her family? As she continues her ascent, she cites various examples from world literature
where some have killed members of their family while keeping himself or herself safe. She
mentions Bursia, king of Bithynia, who killed his father for no reason at all; Ptolemy, king of
Egypt, who killed his father, mother, bothers, and his wife for the love of a young girl; Orestes,
who killed his mother, Clytemnestra; and Nero who killed his mother, Agrippina. Melibea
reasons that these are guilty acts but that her own death brings no guilt. She speaks of others
who killed their children while “quedando sus personas a salvo.” The stated reason that Melibea
gives for reviewing these murders is as a justification of her own death causing pain to her
parents and shortening their lives saying, “Y caso que por mi morir a mis queridos padres sus
días se disminuyesen, ¿quién dubda que no aya avido otros más crueles contra sus padres?”
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(583). Melibea is reasoning that the pain her death will cause to her parents may shorten their
lives, but others have been crueler than that—others have actually killed their parents. However,
her reasoning doesn’t make logical sense as she has already stated that everyone has left her,
which would include her parents. A more logical interpretation of Melibea’s thoughts here is
that she is choosing to not kill her parents and choosing to kill herself instead. Her
transformation to the potentiality of her life is with her own death (583-85).
`

In the moment that Melibea choses to love Calisto, she affirms an authentic existence. In

Heidegger’s words, she becomes a “Being-towards-death” in that she looks to the future in terms
of her own potentiality. Melibea rejects the “they.” Alisa and Lucrecia had warned her not to
see Calisto. Additionally, Pleberio would have prohibited it had he known. Melibea refuses to
hear these voices. This is manifested in her confession to her father as she tells him of the affair.
She says, “Vencida de su amor, dile entrada en tu casa. Quebrantó con escalas las paredes de tu
huerto; quebrantó mi propósito. Perdí mi virginidad” (588). She is not confessing a sin, nor is
she trying to hurt her father by repeating to him the very actions that he had prohibited. Rather
she is saying that Calisto broke her purpose, but it was she herself that gave it to him. Melibea is
saying that she has taken charge of the form of her own life—a life contrary to that which others
would have her live. This is the reason why her death is authentic. She looked to the future and
saw her own potentiality-for-being.
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Chapter 2. The Authenticity of Marcela and the Inauthenticity of Grisóstomo in Don Quijote de
la Mancha
The episode of Marcela and Grisóstomo, from part one, chapters XII to XIV of Don
Quijote de la Mancha, can be viewed as an extended metaphor of Heideggerian authenticity.
Marcela rejects the voice and influence of Others and decides for herself the life that she desires.
Marcela, beautiful and rich, is pursued by many men, including Grisóstomo. Having no desire to
marry, she retires from her life in the village with her uncle to live in solitude with the shepherd
girls. Marcela is the epitome of beauty and she is idealized as such. There is every reason for
Grisóstomo to desire her, and he expects that she will desire him only because he loves her. But
she does not wish to marry. He pursues her and she rejects him. Her rejection brings
Grisóstomo to suicide. The collective voice of the people is that his death is Marcela’s fault; she
is ungrateful, his enemy, and without a heart. The influence of Others is forceful against
Marcela, but she defends herself. She views herself as completely innocent because she is not
responsible for not loving Grisóstomo. Marcela simply does not wish to marry—neither
Grisóstomo or any other, and she stands up against the voices of Others (Cervantes 103-09).
Grisóstomo, however, lives an inauthentic life. He is completely influenced by the other
people that surround him, and, as Heidegger would predict, he lives a life full of anxiety.
Grisóstomo writes a poem shortly before his death which acts as a suicide letter and is
informative in understanding his suicide. The poem is included with other papers that are on his
burial pallet ready to be interred with his body (117-18). Vivaldo, one of the men who
accompanies Don Quijote, takes the poem from the platform and reads it to the group of people
assembled. The poem begins with Grisóstomo addressing Marcela using the name “crüel”
(119). He then speaks of voices inside his breast which combine into “un son doliente.” The
poem speaks of the noisy sounds of animals—lions, wolves, owls, etc., that are so strong that
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they kill the sound of Grisóstomo’s heart. Included in the voices of the animals are the sounds of
the wind and the crowd. The noises of the animals, the elements, and the crowd are comparable
to Heidegger’s sounds of the “they.” These voices are the cause of Grisóstomo’s suicide, not
Marcela’s rejection. The voice is mixed with strange pieces of misery. The sounds he hears are
El rugir del león, del lobo fiero
el temeroso aullido, el silbo horrendo
de escamosa serpiente, el espantable
baladro de algún monstruo, el agorero
graznar de la corneja, y el estruendo
del viento contrastado en mar instable;
del ya vencido toro el implacable
bramido, y de la viuda tortolilla
el sentible arrullar; el triste canto
del envidiado búho, con el llanto
de toda la infernal negra cuadrilla,
salgan con la doliente ánima fuera,
mezclados en un son, de tal manera
que se confundan los sentidos todos,
pues la pena cruel que en mí se halla
para contalla pide nuevos modos. (120)
Grisóstomo writes that these sounds are confusing: “se confundan los sentidos todos.” He is
caught in the web of the noises he hears, just as Heidegger’s Dasein is trapped in the clutches of
the “they.” Each of the animals make a tremendous amount of noise. Among the nouns and

30

adjectives used to describe the noise are “roar,” “frightening howling,” “horrendous hiss,”
“atrocious scream,” “ominous caw,” “racket,” “relentless bellowing,” “sensitive cooing,” “sad
song,” and “sobbing.” Grisóstomo cannot think for himself outside of these sounds that he hears.
The noise of the animals are metonyms for the voices of all the people around him who
tell him how to he should act. Grisóstomo does not have his own opinion and is full of anxiety.
He is caught in the web of the voice of Others, of the “they.” He says “Mata un desdén, atierra la
paciencia, o verdadera o falsa, una sospecha…” (121). Grisóstomo fears an invented world. His
friend Ambrosio explains Grisóstomo’s state of mind saying, “así le fatigaban a Grisóstomo los
celos imaginados y las sospechas temidas como si fueran verdaderas” (124). Grisóstomo
succumbs to his anxiety without allowing it to lead him to resoluteness and an authentic
life. Heidegger writes that the individual has a choice in this matter. Grisóstomo did not make
that choice. He has left himself listening to the voices of Others, which lead him to suicide. He
calls it “inevitable muerte” (121). He is not as Heidegger would say a “Being-towards-death.”
His words are, “Yo muero, en fin, y porque nunca espere buen suceso en la muerte ni en la vida,
pertinaz estaré en mi fantasía” (122). Grisóstomo does not view his death as the horizon of his
potentiality. He cannot see beyond his present pain.
In his song, Grisóstomo hears the collective voices from ten different sources—animals,
wind, and crowd. The sounds come from the following ten sources: 1. the lion, 2. the wolf, 3.
the serpent, 4. the monster, 5. the crow, 6. the wind, 7. the bull, 8. the turtle dove, 9. the owl, and
10. the crowd. Interestingly, the number of ten voices is also found in the narration of the story.
Roberto Ruiz writes of fragmentation which Cervantes intentionally placed within the story of
Marcela and Grisóstomo. As part of that fragmentation, Ruiz explains that the story is told by
ten different narrators. He explains that the number ten does not correspond to ten different

31

people because some of them repeat. The different narrators of the story, as counted by Ruiz are:
1. Antonio, a shepherd boy, who tells the story to Don Quijote and the group of goatherds he is
staying with; 2. Pedro, a goatherd; 3. Vivaldo, a traveler who meets up with Don Quijote the next
day and already knows details of the story; 4. Ambrosio, Grisóstomo’s close friend; 5.
Grisóstomo himself, through the words of his poem; 6. Vivaldo, again, as he reads the poem; 7.
Ambrosio, as he replies to Vivaldo; 8. Marcela, who appears at the end to defend herself, 9. Don
Quijote, who defends the right of Marcela to be left alone; and 10. Ambrosio, as the author of the
epitaph (366-69). The epitaph has the final word, and it says:
Yace aquí de un amador
el mísero cuerpo helado,
que fue pastor de ganado,
perdido por desamor.
Murió a manos de rigor
de una esquiva hermosa ingrata,
con quien su imperio dilata
la tiranía de amor. (Cervantes 128-29)
The correspondence of ten as the number of both the sounds in Grisóstomo’s head and the
number of narrators of the story cannot be a coincidence. Ruiz gives his opinion of the use of the
various narrators writing, “El narrador plural, presente, identificado, viene a ser delegado de otro
colectivo, invisible y anónimo, una vox populi que es en verdad Dei” (69). Cervantes obviously
wanted to magnify the impact of those who opposed Marcela. The voice of the entire
community is against her. She stands alone, with the exception of Don Quijote. He is the only
one who raises his voice in her defense. The collective voice of Others is overwhelming, and it
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drives Grisóstomo to his death. The anxiety that he reveals in his poem is exactly what
Heidegger describes as “uncanny” or the feeling of not being at home in the “they” (Heidegger
233). Grisóstomo is not at home in his subjection to Others, nor is he authentic. He acts
according to the will of Others, not according to his own self-determination. The voices and
sounds that he hears cause him to lose control of his senses, and he crumbles.
After the reading of the poem and an exchange of ideas between Vivaldo and Ambrosio,
Marcela herself appears at the funeral ceremony. She stands on a cliff above the people and
gives her side of the story. She tells the crowd that she has every right to love, or not love,
whomsoever she pleases; just because Grisóstomo loved her does not mean that she is obligated
to love him also. Marcela will not surrender her will to others, wishing instead to live freely in
the company of mountains and streams. She did not mislead Grisóstomo. Speaking of her
intentions, she says, “…le dije yo que la mía era vivir en perpetua soledad y de que sola la tierra
gozarse el fruto de mi recogimiento y los despojos de mi hermosura” (127). A self-determined
woman, Marcela desires to be left alone, not in subjection to anyone. Marcela has acted exactly
opposite of how all those in her culture would have expected. She truly is pursuing her own
ideas of how to live her life, not pursuing the collective will of Others. There is no anxiety in her
discourse, only resoluteness.
To a twenty-first century reader, Marcela is clearly the object of sexual harassment.
Despite her lack of interest in Grisóstomo, he pursued her relentlessly to the point that she had to
leave the town and live with the shepherd girls. Grisóstomo and others followed her to the
country and began to live shepherd lives themselves. To avoid this harassment, she leaves the
countryside and flees into the Sierra Morena to be completely alone. One might say that Marcela
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is the first of the “Me Too” movement. It would take a great deal of self-determination and
resoluteness to do this in the seventeenth-century.
However, it is not clear that literary critics through the centuries have seen Marcela in
this role as a feminist. Salvatore Poeta writes that the Marcela-Grisóstomo episode is more about
“the embodiment of neo-platonic philosophy in opposition to Christian faith, charity, love and
marriage” (67). His conclusion stems from the beginning of the episode where Don Quijote
gives his Golden Age speech to the goatherds. Marcela, according to Poeta, contradicts
Christian philosophy when she states that a woman has the right to love whomsoever she wishes
and that she herself wishes to live a life of solitude. Poeta raises an interesting question as to
what Cervantes’s beliefs were on the matter. He writes, “The inevitable conclusion…is that
Cervantes, in all probability, had no premeditated far-reaching agenda or vision for Marcela
beyond her ‘starring role’ in the Marcela-Grisóstomo episode and even less so as a spokesperson
for gender equality from a strictly ‘political’ perspective and whose words would have an
echoing effect well into our twenty-first century...” (67). Harry Sieber has thoughts similar to
those of Poeta. Sieber speaks of Marcela’s words of freedom and living in solitude saying,
“Freedom to love is turned into self-love. She compares herself to a snake and her beauty to the
snake’s venom, but what she claims to be her ‘natural’ intellect blinds her to the JudaeoChristian symbolism in the comparison” (191). This debate aside, it is clear that Marcela
exhibits the attributes of Heideggerian authenticity in that her self-determination stems from
attributes manifested in the text itself—specifically her manifest lack of anxiety and her
complete resoluteness in her decisions. Her motives in giving her speech are unimportant in the
discussion of her authenticity. Marcela is the perfect example of Heideggerian authenticity. She
plans the future as she wishes it to be, and she is not subjected to the wills of Others.
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Grisóstomo’s poem is an eclogue and copies the form introduced into Spanish literature
by Garcilaso de la Vega, who in turn was influenced by Petrarch and Virgil. Grisóstomo is the
poet and puts himself into the poem as the poetic voice of the shepherd boy. He is a pastor
singing about the pains of his love. He occupies the space of both Nemoroso and Salicio from
Garcilaso’s Égloga I (Garcilaso 56-62). Nemoroso, singing of the loss of Elisa’s love, says that
he sees the sharp edge of death (60). Salicio says that he is dying because Galatea is as hard as
marble and as cold as snow (57). In this case, Grisóstomo assumes the role of both the pastor
who sings of love and the pastor who sings of life in the countryside. But Grisóstomo is a fraud
in this role, he only puts on the clothing of a shepherd boy in imitation of Marcela. Not only
does he imitate the role of the shepherd boy, he also imitates the artform of Garcilaso. Nothing
in his poem is authentic. In this, Grisóstomo resembles the heartsick Calisto in La Celestina,
whom Sempronio describes as “…perdido el sentido, cansado el cuerpo, ...los días mal
dormiendo, las noches todas velando, …saltando paredes, poniendo cada día la vida al tablero,
esperando toros, corriendo cavallos, tirando barra, echando lança, …haziendo escalas, vistiendo
armas, haziendo coplas, pintando motes, sacando invenciones [y otros mil actos de enamorado]”
(Rojas 412-13). Calisto does none of these things. Sempronio copies the acts of Others in
describing Calisto just as Grisóstomo copies the art form of Garcilaso and the roles of Nemoroso
and Salicio.
Both Marcela and Grisóstomo are play acting in assumed roles the same way that Don
Quijote does—based on the books that they have read. The irony is that Marcela is split into two
different people. First, the idealized woman that Grisóstomo and all the others wish her to be.
Second, the person that she is. To be that person, she must physically leave her homeland and
retire into the Sierra Morena. Marcela, as an authentic person, does not play act in her role as a
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shepherd girl; she leaves the town to live in the countryside to escape the harassment of
Grisóstomo and the Others. Ruth El Saffar writes of a paradox in Marcela—she is her own
authentic person, yet she remains under the control of others. El Saffar says:
Cervantes’ rendering of the story makes it clear that Marcela, like Don Quixote, is not
what she thinks she is nor what she appears to be to the men whom her beauty and
inaccessibility move to madness. Believing herself to be untroubled by encumbrances of
any sort, she is in fact controlled by them, spending her time running away from the
constant threat to her ‘autonomy’ that the flocks of adoring shepherds represent. She is
an unwitting but nonetheless active participant in the game of predator and prey hidden in
the chivalric and pastoral visions of romantic love. (62)
The control of the men over Marcela that El Saffar refers to is only effective when she is near
them. They control her only in the form of harassment. Indeed, it is only as she retires into the
Sierra Morena, physically leaving the presence of Others that she can be herself. Marcela
escapes twice: firstly, from her life in the town to the pastoral life in the countryside, and
secondly, from her pastoral life to a life of solitude in the Sierra Morena. Each of these escapes
is to avoid the advances of Grisóstomo. Marcela never intended to live a pastoral life in the
literary sense. In this, Marcela does not play act the way Grisóstomo does. She lives
authentically by fleeing Others. Sieber explains that, “In sum Grisóstomo perceives too late that
Marcela’s role is Marcela in fact, that her rejection is not part of pastoral convention” (193). The
same can be said of Melibea in La Celestina—that she does not play the role of courtly love—
she is Melibea in fact. Neither Marcela nor Melibea play act, only Calisto and Grisóstomo do so
in their respective texts. Don Quijote protects Marcela as she leaves, prohibiting any of the
crowd from following her. In this, it is not clear whether Don Quijote acts authentically or
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inauthentically. Is he playing the role of chivalry, learned from the books he had read, or is this
an authentic act of heroism?
The inauthenticity of Grisóstomo from Don Quijote and the authenticity of Melibea, from
La Celestina, are understood more clearly when compared with each other. Prior to their
respective deaths, Grisóstomo and Melibea each hear voices. Grisóstomo hears the voices of
animals while Melibea hears the voices of the city. In her discourse to her father, Melibea
mentions these sounds saying, “Bien [oyes] este clamor de campanas, este alarido de gentes, este
aullido de canes, este grande estrépito de armas. De todo esto fuy yo la causa” (586). The cause
of all the noise is Melibea. The city is clamoring over her actions, but their noise has no impact
on her. This is not the cause of her suicide. She is dying to be with Calisto, calling to him, “¡O
mi amor y señor Calisto, espérame, ya voy! Detente. Si me esperas, no me incuses la tardança
que hago dando esta última cuenta a mi viejo padre, pues le devo mucho más” (589). Melibea
then tells her father that this is her “agradable fin.”
Melibea’s complete lack of anxiety and her resoluteness at the moment of her death are
seen clearly when compared with Grisóstomo’s total anxiety and lack of resoluteness. These are
the signs of authenticity and inauthenticity as described by Heidegger. Authenticity in Melibea
and inauthenticity in Grisóstomo. Melibea’s words speaking of her intended death as “alegre
partida” and “mi agradable fin” are contrasted with Grisóstomo’s words, “nunca espere buen
suceso en la muerte ni en la vida.” The masses spoke to Grisóstomo, and he shortened the
distance between himself and them until there was nothing left of himself. The masses also
spoke to Melibea, but she broke away and increased her distance from them. Grisóstomo
collapses into the “they,” whereas Melibea escapes from it. She addresses her father asking him
to listen to her so that he may know her experiences and the reasons for her death. She tells him
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to listen without tears. She has no pain; the pain is her father’s. Grisóstomo addresses his
friends speaking of nothing other than his own pain. His pain is caused by Marcela’s “cruelty;”
she has profoundly wounded his heart. Pleberio thinks that Melibea is desperate, but she is
feigning that desperation. The “argumento” at the beginning of the Act clarifies this by saying,
“Finge Melibea dolor de coraçón” (579). Grisóstomo, in contrast, is truly desperate. He writes,
“—si ya a un desesperado son debidas—canten obsequias tristes, doloridas, al cuerpo, a quien se
niegue aun la mortaja…” (123). Heidegger states that anxiety is the opportunity to see the
reality of one’s owness and to decide whether to seek it (Being 235). Melibea so decides,
Grisóstomo does not. Her anxiety had previously led her to her self-determination.
Grisóstomo’s anxiety now leads him to his death.
In her final soliloquy, as she ascends the tower, Melibea takes total responsibility for her
actions. She states, “Todo se ha hecho a mi voluntad” (583). She further takes responsibility for
all the noise round about the city as she speaks to her father. “De todo esto fuy yo la causa,” she
says about the clamor and alarms (586). But Grisóstomo takes no responsibility for his
actions. He is still suspended in the wills and attitudes of Others. He is a victim of Marcela’s
cruelty. She is the one responsible for all the noise he hears. The roar of the lion and the howl of
the wolf are echoes of Marcela’s rejection. These are the sounds of Others which pull him
further into themselves and that “se confundan los sentidos todos” (120). Grisóstomo does not
allow his anxiety to lead him to the resolution of an authentic life. Instead, he allows it to lead to
his inauthentic death.
In these writings, Cervantes and Rojas both describe the living experience of
Being. Their literary words together with the philosophy of Heidegger give us metaphors for
authentic and inauthentic Being. Joseph T. Snow, comparing the characters Melibea and
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Marcela with Diego de San Pedro’s character Laureola, summarizes the individuality of Marcela
and Melibea with these words:
La hermosura entra por los ojos, eso sí. Y amamos el objeto hermoso. Pero el amor no
obliga a ninguna hermosa/amada a amar. Y cuando es así, porfiar es inútil. Tal ha sido
el caso de Laureola y Leriano; igual que el caso de Marcela y Grisóstomo. El amor de un
hombre no obliga. En los dos casos, el objeto, la mujer, quiere vivir libre de tales
obligaciones y lo consigue. El vínculo con el caso de Melibea (y su amante, Calisto), a
pesar de que allí la situación es distinta, se establece en otras palabras de la sabia
Marcela: “el verdadero amor no se divide, y ha de ser voluntario y no forzoso” (102). En
Celestina, después del rechazo inicial, florece la pasión y el que ama es correspondido
por la amada (y viceversa). El amor de Melibea es voluntario y no forzoso. Lo que es
también distinto, al menos en el caso de Melibea, es que es el amor paterno que no obliga
a la amada, la hija, a corresponder con un amor filial. (1409)
Melibea and Calisto give each other love freely and voluntarily, while Snow argues that the love
between Melibea and her father Pleberio is family love and cannot be forced. No love can exist
between Marcela and Grisóstomo—his love would divide Marcela from herself.
Both Marcela and Melibea are authentic individual characters. The fact that Marcela
does not love Grisóstomo and that Melibea does love Calisto does not change their individuality.
The actions of both women are individual and voluntary. As we look at them using
Heideggerian concepts, we see that both women are resolute and free of anxiety in their
respective matters. Grisóstomo, however is not. His inauthenticity is dramatic in comparison
with the calm of the women. In this comparison, we see authenticity contrasted with
inauthenticity. Both Marcela and Melibea sacrificed to find their freedom from Others. Marcela
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gave up her wealth, her family and her friends to be free, and Melibea gave up her life.
Grisóstomo gave nothing, as his death was not an attempt to free himself from the influence of
others but was the result of him collapsing into the “they” further. Marcela and Melibea distance
themselves from Others; Grisóstomo draws closer to them.
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Conclusion
The intersection between the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the works of Spanish
literature studied herein—La Celestina and Don Quijote de la Mancha—is expressed in terms of
the lifeworld of Melibea, Marcela, and Grisóstomo. These are fictional characters; however,
their authors portray them as Beings-in-the-world in the same way that Heidegger’s Dasein is a
Being-in-the-world. Stephen Gilman writes that Fernando de Rojas is “one of the world’s great
artists of human awareness….” (18). The same can be said for Miguel de Cervantes. Each is a
philosopher in his own right. They write of the life experience, and consequently, one might
expect similarities with Heidegger who writes of the phenomenon of living. In this sense,
literature antedates philosophy. There are limits to the usefulness of this type of analysis.
Literature redefines reality in its very nature. While he poet and the philosopher alike have a
phenomenological view of the human being, the poet may stretch the dimensions of actions in an
artistic expression. Recognizing this limitation, evidence still exists that human life, as described
by the philosopher, manifests itself in literature. Indeed, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
shows the true nature of Melibea. Without this clear philosophical method, themes of courtly
love and suicide have obscured her true nature. Philosophy has acted as a lens to more clearly
read literature.
This study has considered only one episode of Don Quijote de la Mancha, which is a
small part of the work. A larger study of the character of Don Quijote through the lens of
Heideggerian authenticity could be helpful in illuminating the rest of the text. Don Quijote is
obviously a character who departs from the mainstream of Others in his society. He acts
completely differently from them. However, his life is determined by the rules of the chivalric
literature that he has read. Does Don Quijote live an inauthentic life because his actions are
determined by the rules of chivalry set out by Others? Does he feel anxiety before his death, and
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does he ultimately shorten the distance between him and Others? Alternatively, once he returns
to being Alonso Quijano at the end of the work, is he a resolute character, free from the
influences of all Others?
The Heideggerian authenticity of Melibea in La Celestina and the inauthenticity of
Grisóstomo in Don Quijote de la Mancha become clear when they are placed under the lens of
Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger explains that the natural state of the human being is to live
with Others and to become part of them. As the individual loses herself to Others, she naturally
experiences anxiety. The authentic individual uses that anxiety to become resolute and to see
that she has potential to live her life as she wishes it to be. The inauthentic being does not do so
and continues to her death living as Others dictate. Melibea begins as a Heideggerian inauthentic
character; however, throughout the course of the work she transforms into an authentic Being
who leaves the influence of Others to live a life of her own determination. She experiences
anxiety with the judgement of Others and uses that anxiety to gain resoluteness. Her anxiety and
resoluteness cause her to see the potentiality of her possibilities, which she seizes to become a
self-determined individual. Her death comes as she looks to the potentiality of such a life. On
the other hand, Grisóstomo begins as a Heideggerian inauthentic character and remains so
throughout the entire episode. He never pursues life apart from the influence of Others, and he is
subject to them and their opinions. He dies tormented by their judgment, never allowing his
anxiety to show him any potentiality for self-determination. Heideggerian philosophy helps
illuminate the characters of both Melibea and Grisóstomo, providing the reader with examples
upon which to base his or her own life. Philosophy and literature inform the reader of the
possibility of an authentic life.
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